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Abstract
We consider von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in assignment
games. In the symmetric case Shapley (1959) proved some necessary
conditions of vNM stability. In this paper we generalize this result for
any assignment game. We show that a V set of imputation is stable
if and only if (i) is internally stable, (ii) is connected, (iii) contains
an imputation with 0 payoff to all buyers and an imputation with
0 payoff to all sellers, (iv) contains the core of the semi-imputations
in the rectangular set spanned by any two points of V. With this
characterization we give a new proof to the existence of stable sets.
Moreover using these reult if the core is not stable we can construct
infinite many stable set.
1 Introduction
Assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) are models of two-sided match-
ing markets with transferable utilities where the aim of each player on one
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side is to form a profitable coalition with a player on the other side. Since
only such bilateral cooperations are worthy, these games are completely de-
fined by the matrix containing the cooperative worths of all possible pairings
of players from the two sides.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) showed that the core of an assignment game
is precisely the set of dual optimal solutions to the assignment optimization
problem on the underlying matrix of mixed-pair profits. This implies that (i)
every assignment game has a non-empty core; (ii) the core can be determined
without explicitly generating the entire coalitional function of the game; and
(iii) there are two special vertices of the core, in each of which every player
from one side of the market receives his/her highest core-payoff while every
player from the other side of the market receives his/her lowest core-payoff.
Besides the above fundamental results concerning the core, several impor-
tant contributions dealing with other solution concepts have been published
in the last decade. The classical solution concept proposed and studied by von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) in their monumental work has remained
an intriguing exception, although Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) character-
ized a subclass of assignment games where the core is the unique stable set.
The existence question in the general case was settled affirmatively by Nu´n˜ez
and Rafels (2009), who proved that, as conjectured by Shapley (cf. Section
8.4 in (Shubik, 1984)), the union of the cores of certain derived subgames is
always a stable set.
In special cases we know much more then the existence of stable sets. Bed-
nay (2014) described every stable set in the one-seller assignment games as a
graph of a special monotonic function. Shapley (1959) considered the sym-
metric market game (glove market). He showed some nice properties of the
stable sets, for example every stable set is a monotonic curve end in one
endpoint of this curve every buyer gets zero payoff in the other endpoint ev-
ery seller gets zero payoff. In this paper we generalize the results of Shapley
(1959) we show that most of the properties what he showed in the symmetric
case also holds in any assignment games (with little changes) for stable sets.
We add a new condition and with this we can characterize the stable sets in
assignment games. With this characterizaton we can easily prove the result
of Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) and the result of Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2009).
Moreover we can prove that if the core of an assignment game is not stable
then the game has infinite many stable sets. We can also prove that the
stable set conjectured by Shapley is not only unique in the principal section
of the game but it is the unique stable set which contains the buyeroptimal
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and the selleroptimal elements of the proóincipal section.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic definitions
A transferable utility cooperative game on the nonempty finite set P of play-
ers is defined by a coalitional function w : 2P → R satisfying w(∅) = 0. The
function w specifies the worth of every coalition S ⊆ P .
Given a game (P,w), a payoff allocation x ∈ RP is called feasible, if
x(P ) ≤ w(P ); efficient, if x(P ) = w(P ); individually rational, if xi =
x({i}) ≥ w({i}) for all i ∈ P ; coalitionally rational, if x(S) ≥ w(S) for
all S ⊆ P ; where, using the standard notation, x(S) = ∑i∈S xi if S 6= ∅, and
x(∅) = 0. We denote by I ′(P,w) the semi-imputation set (i.e., the set of
feasible and individually rational payoffs), by I(P,w) the imputation set (i.e.,
the set of efficient and individually rational payoffs), and by C(P,w) the core
(i.e., the set of efficient and coalitionally rational payoffs) of the game (P,w).
Semi-imputations which are not efficent are called strict semi-imputations.
The game (P,w) is called superadditive, if S ∩T = ∅ implies w(S ∪T ) ≥
w(S) + w(T ) for all S, T ⊆ P ; balanced, if its core C(P,w) is not empty.
Given a game (P,w), the excess e(S, x) := w(S) − x(S) is the usual
measure of gain (or loss if negative) to coalition S ⊆ P if its members depart
from allocation x ∈ RP in order to form their own coalition. Note that
e(∅, x) = 0 for all x ∈ RP , and
C(P,w) = {x ∈ RP : e(P, x) = 0, e(S, x) ≤ 0 ∀S ⊂ P},
i.e., the core is the set of allocations which yield nonpositive excess for all
coalitions.
We say that allocation y dominates allocation x via coalition S (notation:
y domS x) if y(S) ≤ w(S) and yk > xk ∀ k ∈ S. We further say that allo-
cation y dominates allocation x (notation: y dom x) if there is a coalition S
such that y dominates x via S. We can also define the core of a game with the
dominance relation. The core of a game consist the preimputations which are
not dominated by any other preimputation. Similarly to this new definition
of the core we can define the core of a set X by the elements of X which are
not dominated by any other element of X . Note that the dominance relation
is irreflexive but need not be either asymmetric or transitive. This is the
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major source of the difficulties encountered when working with the following
solution concept advocated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). A
(nonempty) set Z of imputations is called a stable set if the following two
conditions hold:
• (internal stability): there exist no x, y ∈ Z such that y dom x
• (external stability): for every x ∈ I \ Z there exists y ∈ Z such that
y dom x.
Note that evry stable set is closed and the core is always a set of imputations
which satisfies internal stability. It is commonly known that in superadditive
games the core is precisely the set of imputations which are not dominated
by any other imputation. Consequently, the core is a subset of any stable
set.
Observe that for x, y ∈ I, if y domS x then (i) x(S) < w(S), i.e. an
imputation can be dominated only via coalitions having positive excess at
that imputation; and (ii) 2 ≤ |S| ≤ |P | − 1, i.e. among imputations domi-
nation can occur only via a proper coalition containing at least two players.
Another useful observation is that inessential coalitions are redundant for
the domination relation. We call coalition S inessential in a game w, if
w(S) ≤ ∑1≤j≤r w(Sj) for a partition S = ⋃1≤j≤r Sj, and call S essential if
it is not inessential. Suppose now that y domSx for some S that is inessen-
tial because w(S) ≤ ∑1≤j≤r w(Sj). Then we must have y domSjx for some
1 ≤ j ≤ r. Consequently, if E(P,w) denotes the set of all essential coalitions
in game (P,w) then dom = ⋃S∈E(P,w) domS.
We say a set Z is X -stable if Z ⊆ X and
• (internal stability): there exist no x, y ∈ Z such that y dom x
• (external stability): for every x ∈ X \ Z there exists y ∈ Z such that
y dom x.
This is a generalization of the stable set concept. The „normal” stable sets
are the I-stable sets (or I ′-stable sets).
2.2 Assignment games
In this paper we consider a special type of cooperative games. The player
set is P = M ∪ N with M ∩ N = ∅, players i ∈ M = {1, . . . ,m} are called
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sellers, and players j ∈ N = {1′, . . . , n′} are called buyers. The coalitional
function w = wA is generated from the m× n nonnegative matrix
A =

a11 a12 . . . a1n
a21 a22 . . . a2n
... ... . . . ...
am1 am2 . . . amn








Where Π(X, Y ) denotes the value of the maximal matching between sets
X and Y . Notice that wA(S) = 0 if S ⊆ M or S ⊆ N . In particular,
wA({k}) = 0 for all k ∈ P .
Assignment games are obviously superadditive. To simplify notation, we
drop reference to wA or A whenever this causes no confusion.
To emphasize the special role of the sellers and buyers, we shall write the
payoff allocations as (u;v) ∈ Rm × Rn.
In assignment game wA if domination occurs among semi-imputations
it also occurs via coalitions {i, j′} with aij > 0. We shall simply write
(u;v) domij (u′;v′) if ui + vj ≤ aij and ui > u′i, vj > v′j. Since the set
of essential coalitions consists of mixed-pair coalitions with positive value
and the single-player coalitions, but domination between imputations is not





We say that the mixed-pair {i, j′} is active at imputation (u;v) if 0 < aij −
(ui + vj), since (u;v) could be dominated by another imputation via the
mixed-pair coalition {i, j′}.
3 The characterization
In this section we show that
Theorem 3.1 A set V ⊆ I is stable in an assignment game if and only if it
1. is internally stable,
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2. is connected,
3. contains an imputation with 0 payoff to all buyers and an imputation
with 0 payoff to all sellers,
4. contains the core of the semi-imputations in the rectangular set spanned
by any two points of V.
The necessity of these properties was proved by Shapley (1959) for glove
markets (assignment games with aij = 1 for all i ∈M and j ∈ N). The proof
of the necessity in the general case is similar to the proof of Shapley. Before
the proof we need some preparation. Suppose that V is a subset of the set of
imutations which satisfies the four conditions in 3.1 Theorem. We denote the
coordinatewise maximum of the vectors x and y by ∨ and the minimum by
∧. Observe that if (x;y) dominates (u1∨u2;v1∧v2), then it also dominates
(u1;v1) or (u2;v2). The set X ⊆ I ′ is said to be a lattice if for every
(u1;v1), (u2;v2) ∈ X the payoff vectors (u1∨u2;v1∧v2), (u1∧u2;v1∨v2) are
also in X . Shapley and Shubik (1972) showed that the core of an assignment
game is a lattice and Shapley (1959) showed that this also holds for stable
sets in glove markets. This property is also true in assignment games. To see
this suppose that for some stable set V the vector (u1 ∨ u2;v1 ∧ v2) is not
in V . If it is a semi-imputation it is dominated by an element of V . In this
case this vector also dominates (u1;v1) or (u2;v2) in contradiction with the
internal stability of V . If it is not a semi-imputation then (u1 ∧ u2;v1 ∨ v2)
is a strict semi-imputation and since V ⊆ I we have (u1 ∧ u2;v1 ∨ v2) /∈ V
which leads to the same contradiction. See also in Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2013).
With the lattice property of the set V we can easily see the necessity of
the third condition: since V is a closed lattice, there is a vector (u;v) ∈ V
which gives the minimal payoffs to the sellers and the maximal payoffs to
the buyers. If u 6= 0, then (0;v) is a strict semi-imputation which is not
dominated by V because no buyers can get more in V which contradicticts
the external stability of V .
Since med(x, y, z) = (x∨ y)∧ (y∨ z)∧ (z ∨x) = (x∧ y)∨ (y∧ z)∨ (z ∧x)
where med(x, y, z) denotes the median of x, y and z, we have that the median
of every three elements of V is also in V . Observe that if (x;y) is between
(u1;v1) and (u2;v2) (which means (x;y) = med((u1;v1), (x;y), (u2;v2)),
(u3;v3) domij(x;y) and (u1;v1), (u2;v2), (u3;v3) don’t dominate each other,
then
med((u1;v1), (u2;v2), (u3;v3)) domij(x;y).
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If we use this observation for a vector (x;y) /∈ V which is between two
elements (u1;v1) and (u2;v2) of V , we have more than the external stability
of V : we get an element of V which dominates (x;y) and this vector is
between (u1;v1) and (u2;v2). From this property we get immediately the
necessity of the fourth condition. We can also get the second one: we show
that between every two points of V there is also a third point. Let (u1;v1)
and (u2;v2) be two elements of V . If the average of these two points is in
V then we have a third point between (u1;v1) and (u2;v2). If the average
is not in V then there is a vector (u3;v3) ∈ V which is between (u1;v1) and
(u2;v2) and this vector dominates (x;y). With the closedness of V we can
prove following Shapley (1959) that every stable set is connected. To prove
the sufficiency of these properties we need a couple of lemmas:
Lemma 3.1 Every set V satisfying the four properties in theorem 3.1 is a
lattice.
Proof.
Let (u1;v1), (u2;v2) be two elements of V . Observe that the vectors (u1 ∨
u2;v1∧v2) and (u1∧u2;v1∨v2) are not dominated by any vectors between
(u1;v1) and (u2;v2). Because of the fourth condition if (u1 ∨ u2;v1 ∧ v2)
or (u1 ∧ u2;v1 ∨ v2) is an imputation then it is also an element of V . If
(u1 ∨ u2;v1 ∧ v2) or (u1 ∨ u2;v1 ∧ v2) is a strict semi-imputation, then by
the fourth condition it is an element of V which contradicts the condition
V ⊆ I. If (u1 ∨ u2;v1 ∧ v2) or (u1 ∧ u2;v1 ∨ v2) is not a semi-imputation,
then the other one is a strict semi-imputation which leads to a contradiction.

Lemma 3.2 Every two points of V is connected with a coordinatewise mono-
tonic curve in V.
Proof.
Let (u0;v0) and (u1;v1) be two elements of V . We can assume that u0 ≤
u1 and v0 ≥ v1 because we showed in lemma 3.1 that (u0 ∨u1;v0 ∧ v1) ∈ V
and if there is a monotone curve between (u0;v0) and (u0 ∨u1;v0 ∧v1) and
another one between (u0 ∨ u1;v0 ∧ v1) and (u1;v1) and we connect these
two curves together we get a monotone curve between (u0;v0) and (u1;v1).
Since V is connected there is a continuous curve (ut;vt)t∈[0;1] ⊆ V between
(u0;v0) and (u1;v1). Let u′t = med(u0,ut,u1) and v′t = med(v0,vt,v1).
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Since V is a lattice (u′t;v′t)t∈[0;1] ⊆ V . Let u′′t = mins≤t u′s and v′′t =
maxs≤t v′s. Obviously the curve (u′′t;v′′t)t∈[0;1] is monotone, (u′′0;v′′0) =
(u0;v0), (u′′1;v′′1) = (u1;v1) and since V is a lattice (u′′t;v′′t)t∈[0;1] ⊆ V . 
With this lemma we can prove a condition which is stronger then the
internal stability.
Corollary 3.1 Let (x;y), (u;v) ∈ V such that xi > ui and yj > vj for
some i ∈ M and j′ ∈ N then ui + vj ≥ aij (the internal stability states only
xi + yj > aij
Proof.
Suppose that ui + vj < aij. Let s, t ∈ R such that s + t ≤ aij, ui < s < xi
and vj < t < yj. (u ∨ x,v ∧ y), (u ∧ x,v ∨ y) ∈ V because V is a lattice.
There is a vector (x1,y1) ∈ V in the monotonic curve connecting (u;v) and
(u ∨ x,v ∧ y), and a point (x2,y2) ∈ V in the monotonic curve connecting
(x;y) and (u ∧ x,v ∨ y) such that x1i = s = x2i . Note that y1j = vj and
y2j = yj. There is a vector (x3,y3) ∈ V in the monotonic curve connecting
(x1,y1) and (x2,y2) such that y3j = t. For this vector x3i = s means that
(x3;y3) domij(u;v) which contracicts the internal stability. 
Lemma 3.3 Every set V satisfying the four properties in Theorem 3.1 is
closed.
Proof.
Let (ui;vi)i∈N ⊆ V and let (u;v) be the limit of this sequence. Since each
(ui;vi) is in V ⊆ I we get (u;v) ∈ I. By the second condition, there are
elements (u; 0) and (0;v) in V . As V is a lattice, every element of V is
between these two vectors. Since each (ui;vi) is between (u; 0) and (0;v)
we get that (u;v) is also between them.
Now suppose that (u;v) /∈ V . Then (u;v) is between (u; 0) and (0;v), thus
there is a mixed pair {i; j′} which can dominate (u;v) with a vector between
(u; 0) and (0;v). Because of lemma 3.2, there is a vector (x;y) ∈ V between
(u; 0) and (0;v) such that xi − yj = ui − vj. If xi > ui and yj > vj then
∃k : xi > uki , yj > vkj and uki + vkj < aij in contradiction with 3.1 corollary.
Now we can assume that xi ≤ ui and yj ≤ vj. Let (x1;y1) = (u ∧ x;v ∨ y),
(x2;y2) = (u ∨ x;v ∧ y). There are two cases:
• (x1;y1) or (x2;y2) is a semi-imputation but is not in V : assume that
(x1;y1) is this vector. By lemma 3.1, (u′i;v′i) = (ui ∧ x;vi ∨ y) ∈
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V ∀ i ∈ N and lim(u′i;v′i) = (x1;y1) = (u′;v′). Thus, (x1;y1) is
between (0;v) and (x;y) but between these points there is no vector
which dominates (x1;y1) via the mixed-pair {i; j′}.
• both (x1;y1), (x2;y2) ∈ V : since lemma 3.1, (u′i;v′i) = med((x1;y1); (ui;vi); (x2;y2)) ∈
V ∀ i ∈ N and lim(u′i;v′i) = (u;v) = (u′;v′). Thus, (u;v) is between
(x1;y1) and (x2;y2) but between these points there is no vector which
dominates (u;v) via the mixed-pair {i; j′}.
In both cases we got two points from V and a sequence (u′i;v′i) ⊆ V between
them such that the limit of this sequence is outside of the set V and this limit
is not dominated by any vector in the rectangular set spanned by the two
points of V . Now change (u; 0) and (0;v) to these two points, (u;v) to
(u′;v′) and the sequence (ui;vi) to (u′i;v′i). If we do this step again we
can exclude another possible dominating mixed-pair. After a finite number
of steps we exclude all mixed-pairs and we get two points of V and a third
outside of V between them which is not dominated by any vector of the






(x1i ; y1j )
(x2i ; y2j )
Now we can prove the sufficiency of the four conditions. The proof will
be very similar to the proof of lemma 3.3.
The internal stability of V is our first condition thus we only need to prove
the external stability of V . Let (u;v) be a semi-imputation outside of V . We
can assume that (u;v) is between (0;v) and (u; 0). To see this suppose that
this claim does not hold and let (u′;v′) = med((0;v); (u;v); (u; 0)). This
vector is also a semi-imputation outside of V and if this is dominated by a
vector from V , this vector also dominates (u;v).
By the fourth condition, there is at least one mixed pair which can dominate
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(u;v) between (0;v) and (u; 0). The proof is similar to the proof of the
closedness of V . There are two cases:
1. There exists a mixed pair {i; j′} such that (u;v) can be dominated via this
coalition between (0;v) and (u; 0) and there is a vector (x;y) ∈ V between
(0;v) and (u; 0) such that xi > ui and yi > vj
2. For each mixed pair {i; j′} such that (u;v) can be dominated via this
coalition between (0;v) and (u; 0) there is no vector (x;y) ∈ V between
(0;v) and (u; 0) with xi > ui and yi > vj.
In the second case we can do the same as in the proof of the closedness of
V because by the internal stability of V if (u′;v′) is dominated by a vector






(s, t), (x4i ; y4j )
(u;v)
(x1i ; y1j )
(x2i ; y2j )
(x3i ; y3j )
s + t = aij
In the first case if xi+yj ≤ aij then (x;y) dominates (u;v). Let xi+yj >
aij. Because of the connectedness of V we can assume that ui− vj = xi− yj.
Let s, t ∈ R such that s + t = aij and s − t = ui − vj = xi − yj. By
lemma 3.2, there are two vectors (x1;y1), (x2;y2) ∈ V such that (x1;y1) is
between (0;v) and (x;y), (x2;y2) is between (x;y) and (u; 0), x1i = s and
y2j = t. Let (x3;y3) = (x1 ∨ u;y1 ∧ v) and (x4;y4) = (x2 ∧ x3;y2 ∨ y3) =
med((x1;y1), (u;v), (x2;y2)). Since x4i = s and y4j = t, the vector (x4;y4)
dominates (u;v). If it is in V , we have proved that V dominates (u;v). If
(x4;y4) /∈ V then there are two cases:
1. If (x4;y4) is a semi-imputation, then it is enough to show that V dominates
(x4;y4) because if a vector from V dominates med((x1;y1), (u;v), (x2;y2)),
then it also dominates one of (x1;y1), (u;v), (x2;y2). Because of the internal
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stability of V , we get that this vector dominates (u;v). Thus (x4;y4) is
between (x1;y1) and (x2;y2) and between these vectors the coalition {i; j′}
can’t dominate anything. Thus we excluded one coalition.
2. If (x4;y4) is not a semi-imputation, then (u∧x1;v∨y1) or (u∨x2;v∧y2)
is a strict semi-imputation (because if (x3;y3) is a semi-imutation, then
(x3 ∨ x2;y3 ∧ y2) = (u ∨ x2;v ∧ y2) or (x4;y4) is a semi-imputation and if
(x3;y3) is not a semi-imputation, then (u∧x1;v∨y1) is a semi-imputation).
Let this vector be (x5;y5). If (x5;y5) is dominated by V then (u;v) is also
dominated thus it is enough to show that V dominates (x5;y5).
Now we can do the same, once again with (x5;y5) instead of (u;v), and
(x1;y1) instead of (u; 0) or (x2;y2) instead of (0;v). But now (x5;y5) is a
strict semi imputation, and because of the closedness of V there exists  > 0
for all (x;y) ∈ V such that xi > x5i and yj > y5j satisfying xi + yj > aij + 
If we do the same the coalition {i; j′} get more than in (x5;y5) with at least
/2 thus after a finite number of repetition we get a vector (xk;yk) /∈ V
such that xki + ykj ≥ aij. If (xk;yk) is dominated by V then (u;v) is also
dominated via the same coalition. Thus after a finite number of steps we can
exclude one coalition.

Based on the above characterization we can give a simpler proof than
in Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2013) to the conjecture by Shapley is stable. We can
assume that in the main diagonal of A there is an optimal assignment. We
call principal section the subset of imputations in which all mixed pair in
the main diagonal (which is a maximal matching) gets exactly their value.
Shapley stated but have not prooved that the core of the principal section
is stable. We will denote this set by CB = {(x;y) ∈ I : ∀ i, j : xi + yj ≥
aij or xi = aii or yj = ajj} Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2013) proved that this set
is stable and it is the unique stable set in the principal section. Using the
characterization we can get a stronger result for uniqueness. If we denote by
d the main diagonal of A, we can easily see that this set is the core of the
semi-imputations between (0;d) and (d; 0). Observe that if this set is stable
it is the unique stable set containing the vectors (0;d) and (d; 0). To prove
the stability of CB we will check the four conditions:
1. The internal stability is obvious from the definition of CB
2. Similarly to the proof of the lattice property of the core or the stable sets
it can be shown that CB is a lattice. It is known Shapley, Shubik (1972)
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that the core of the game is nonempty. Let (u;v) ∈ CB. Obviously
from the definition of CB for each x ∈ R the vector med((0;d), (u +
1x;v − 1x), (d; 0)) ∈ CB. Thus there exists a curve (ut;vt) between
(0;d) and (d; 0). Let (x1;y1) and (x2;y2) be two elements of CB. Since
CB is a lattice the curve med((x1;y1); (ut;vt); (x2;y2)) is a curve in
CB connecting (x1;y1) and (x2;y2).
3. It is obvious from (0;d), (d; 0) ∈ B
4. Suppose not and there exist vectors (u1;v1), (u2;v2) ∈ CB and a vec-
tor (x;y) between them and for every mixed pair at least one of the
following condition holds: xi + yj ≥ aij or xi = u1i ∨ u2i or yj = v1j ∨ v2j .
In this case (x;y) is also an element of B. We can assume that u1 ≤ u2
and v1 ≥ v2. If xi = u2i then since (u2;v2) ∈ B at least one of the
following must hold: aij ≤ u2i + v2j (≤ xi + yj) or aii = u2i (= x2i ) or
ajj = v2j (≤ x2j ≤ v1j ≤ ajj). Similarly, we can prove that if yj = v1j then
aij ≤ xi + yj or aii = xi or ajj = yj must hold.
Since this set CB always contains the core and it is the core if and only
if the matrix A has a dominant diagonal we proved that the core of an
assignment game is stable if and only if the matrix of the game has a dominant
diagonal.
Remark 3.1 We can get a similar characterization of X -stable sets if X is
a connected lattice and it is a subset of the semi-imputation set. A set V ⊆ X
is X -stable if and only if it
1. is internally stable,
2. is connected,
3. contains an buyeroptimal and the selleroptimal imputation of X ,
4. contains the core of the elements of X in the rectangular set spanned
by any two points of V.
Corollary 3.2 Let A,A′ ∈ Rm×n such that A ≤ A′ and wA(P ) = wA′(P ).
If V is stable in the assignment game belonging to the matrix A and V ′ is
V-stable in the assignment game belongs to the matrix A′, then V ′ is stable
(not only V-stable) in the game belonging to A′.
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It can be easily checked that if A and A′ differ in only one element the
core of V in the game belonging to A′ is always V -stable (and also stable) in
the game belonging to A′.
With these corollaries we can construct stable sets, and give an other
proof to the theorem of Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2009): if A is a diagonal matrix
then the principal section is obviously stable. In the first step we increase
one element of the matrix A and take the core of the original stable set in
the new game. This set is stable in the new game. Then we inrease another
element of the matrix and so on.
We can see how it works in the following example. In the first game the
matrix is diagonal so the principal section {(u1, u2; v1, v2) ∈ R4+such thatu1+
v1 = 7, u2 +v2 = 3} is stable. Than we increase the a12 element of the matrix
to 4 and we take the core of the principal section in the new game. This is
the trapezoid with vertices (1; 0), (4; 3), (7; 3) and (7; 0) (the payoffs of the
sellers) and the line segment between (0; 0) and (1; 0). This set is setable in
the new game. In the last step we increase the a21 element of the matrix and
we take the core (in the new game) of the stable set of the privious game.
This is the union of the parallelogram and the two horizontal line segment












































If the core of an assignment game is not stable, then the game has infinite
many stable sets.
It can be easily prove that in the 2-buyers, 2-sellers case if the core is not
stable then the union of the core and at most 2 monotonic curve is a stable
set. onen monotonic curve connects the buyer-optimal point of the core
with vector such that every seller gets zero payoff, and the other monotonic
curve connects the seller-optimal point of the core with vector such that
every buyer gets zero payoff. In the example we can replace the line segment
connecting the vectors (5, 3; 2, 0) and (7, 3; 0, 0) to any monotonic curve
connecting the vectors (5, 3; 2, 0) and (a, b; 0, 0) such that a ≥ 5, b ≥ 3 and
a+ b = 10. Using this result we can easily construct ininite many stable sets
in assignmet games with diagonal matrix except one element which is not
dominant diagonal. And starting the construction above from these matrix
and stable set we get infinite many different stable sets.
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